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The majority of the Supreme Court (Lady
Hale, Kerr and Wilson LJJ) in a landmark
case (see, Whittington Hospital NHS Trust v
XX [2020] UKSC 14) has held that a
claimant was entitled to recover damages,
following the hospital’s admitted negligence
in failing to detect her cervical cancer in
time, to fund the cost of commercial
surrogacy arrangements using donor eggs in
a country where such arrangements are not
unlawful. It will be convenient to examine
the earlier case law on this important area
before turning to the Supreme Court
judgment.
The Briody ruling
In Briody v St Helen’s and Knowsley Area
Health Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1010,
the claimant sought damages against the
defendant health authority, whose negligence
had deprived her of her uterus, in order that
she could try to have two children through a
surrogacy arrangement involving the use of
the claimant’s own eggs, fertilising them
with her partner’s sperm and implanting the
resulting embryos in the womb of a
surrogate mother in California. The expert
evidence, however, showed that the chances
of success were minimal, being less than
1%.
The Court of Appeal, affirming the decision
of Ebsworth J at first instance (see, [2000]
PIQR Q165) rejected the claim on a number
of grounds. First, since the chance of
successful outcome of a surrogacy using the
claimant’s own eggs was so small, it was
unreasonable to expect the defendant to pay
the expense of it. Secondly, although there
was a higher chance of success using donor
eggs, such a course would not be restorative
of the claimant’s position before she was
injured – it would be seeking to make up for
some of what she had lost by giving her
something different since neither the
pregnancy nor the child would be hers. In
the words of Hale LJ, at [26] and [28]:
‘. . . while everyone has the right to try
and have their own children by natural
means, no one has the right to be
provided with a child . . . I repeat,
neither the child nor the pregnancy
would be hers; without either, the
situation is no different from adoption.’
Thirdly, a commercial surrogacy
arrangement was clearly unlawful in the UK
by virtue of s 2(1) of the Surrogacy
Arrangements Act 1985 (‘the 1985 Act’)
and, therefore, it would be wrong to award
damages to acquire a child by a method
which did not comply with UK law. On this
point, Judge LJ stated, at [39]:
‘. . . the entire surrogacy agreement was
unlawful in the United Kingdom. The
judge was being asked to award
damages for the express purpose of
enabling Ms Briody to be provided with
the wherewithal to pay for an unlawful
contractual arrangement. That is not a
principled basis on which to make a
compensatory award.’
Significantly, the fact that the claimant
would not herself be committing a criminal
offence under s 2(1) of the 1985 Act (see,
s 2(2)), did not detract from his Lordship’s
emphatic conclusion on this point. Hale LJ
was of the same view, at [15]:
‘. . . I have no difficulty in agreeing with
the judge that the proposals put to her
were contrary to the public policy of
this country, clearly established in
legislation, and that it would be quite
unreasonable to expect a defendant to
fund it.’
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XX v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust
(a) First instance
The claimant became infertile as a result of
the defendant NHS trust’s negligent delay in
diagnosing her with cancer of the cervix.
She brought an action for damages against
the defendant claiming the cost of
undergoing four pregnancies by surrogacy
arrangements which she intended to make
either in California on a commercial basis or
in the UK on a non-commercial basis, using
her own eggs which had been harvested
before she became infertile or, alternatively,
donor eggs.
At first instance, Sir Robert Nelson (see XX
v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust [2017]
EWHC 2318 (QB)) rejected the claim for
the cost of surrogacy arrangements in
California holding that, in line with the
earlier Court of Appeal ruling in Briody, it
was contrary to public policy to award
damages for the cost of a commercial
surrogacy which was illegal in the UK by
virtue of s 2(1) of the 1985 Act regardless of
the fact that it was lawful in California. He
also limited damages for the cost of
surrogacy arrangements in the UK using the
claimant’s own eggs to lead to two children.
Here again, he felt bound by Briody to
reject the claim concerning the use of donor
eggs on the basis that the use of such eggs
would not be restorative of the loss suffered
by the claimant, which was the inability to
have her child, not a child. In his words, at
[50]–[51]:
‘The loss that the injured mother
sustains is the inability to have her
child, not a child. The use of donor eggs
is not, therefore, restorative of her
loss . . . If the loss was to be properly
regarded as the loss of a child, it would
not be reasonable or proportionate to
require a defendant to pay for the cost
of donor egg surrogacy. I, therefore,
limit the claim for surrogacy in the UK,
using the claimant’s own eggs, to the
cost of surrogacy for 2 children, as I am
satisfied on the balance of probabilities
on the expert evidence that the claimant
will achieve two live births.’
It was argued on behalf of the claimant that
public policy had changed since the Briody
ruling. In particular, the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act 2008 (‘the 2008 Act’)
had amended the 1985 Act by permitting
reasonable payment for arranging surrogacy
through non-profit agencies and the family
courts now granted parental orders to
intended parents who have entered into
commercial surrogacy arrangements abroad,
and have retrospectively authorised
commercial payments to surrogates and
surrogate agencies pursuant to s 54 of the
2008 Act. This argument, however, was
strongly rejected by Sir Robert Nelson, at
[45]–[46]:
‘The HFEA does not make commercial
surrogacy contracts legal, only
non-profit arrangements. Commercial
surrogacy arrangements remain illegal.
The parental orders made by the family
courts do not affect this issue; they
relate to the welfare of the child in
respect of children already born and are
not concerned with either the welfare of
an intended mother or any claim she
may have, either directly or by analogy.
As Mrs Justice Ebsworth said in Briody
at first instance, whether one should
award damages in order to bring a new
child into the world is a quite different
question from how one should look
after and pay for a child who is already
here. This comment was made in
relation to IVF claims and before the
HFEA and SAA but remains apposite.’
According to his Lordship, therefore, there
was no inconsistency between the recovery
of payments under the parental order
jurisdiction and the refusal of an award of
damages based upon a claim which requires
the claimant to rely upon a commercial
arrangement which is clearly unlawful in
this country.
(b) Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal (see XX v Whittington
Hospital NHS Trust [2018] EWCA Civ
2832) reversed the first instance decision on
a number of grounds. First, the
interpretation of s 2(1) of the 1985 Act was
limited to render acts of commercial
surrogacy unlawful in the UK only, not to
prohibit individuals from entering into such
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arrangements in any other country.
Secondly, barring recovery of the Californian
surrogacy costs would prevent the full
recovery of damages by the claimant so as
to restore her to the position she had been
in prior to the defendant’s negligence and
would be a disproportionate response to the
illegality of commercial surrogacy
arrangements in the UK. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court of Appeal considered
that there was no longer a public policy bar
to recovery of the costs of commercial
surrogacy that was lawfully entered into
abroad. Thirdly, the Court concluded that
an award of damages for the costs of
surrogacy using donor eggs constituted
legitimate, restorative compensation to the
claimant. The distinction between ‘own egg’
surrogacy and ‘donor egg’ surrogacy was
now artificial given modern social attitudes
towards family and children: see, McCombe
LJ, at [92]–[94] and King LJ at [101]–[105].
Fourthly, since the prospects of a live child
being born from the surrogacy arrangements
were good, damages were recoverable for
the cost of such arrangements regardless
whether the treatment was to be undertaken
in the UK or California using the claimant’s
own eggs or donor eggs.
Supreme Court ruling
(a) The arguments
In the Supreme Court in Whittington, much
emphasis was placed by the claimant on the
new formulation of the law of illegality
adopted by the majority of the Supreme
Court in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42,
which was also referred to at some length
by McCombe LJ in the Court of Appeal, at
[69]–[72], in the following terms:
‘First, the underlying purpose of the
prohibition in section 2(1) of the [1985
Act], as amended, is to render acts of
commercial surrogacy unlawful in the
UK. It does not purport to legislate for
any country other than the UK and does
not prohibit Ms X from doing what she
proposes. Her intended action is not the
target of the current legislation (as
amended) at all . . . It cannot
conceivably be said now that surrogacy
as such is contrary to the public policy
of our law. Secondly, subject to the
question of the extent of recoverability
of damages to achieve restoration of a
claimant into his/her position prior to
the tort, I see that a bar to recovery here
would prevent full recovery of damages
such as to restore Ms Xs personal
autonomy in being able to found a
family. Thirdly, it seems to me clear that
it would constitute overkill if recovery
were to be barred in this case. A
notional aversion to a lawful act abroad
by reference to a prohibition here seems
to be just that, overkill.’
It was argued, however, on behalf of the
defendant NHS trust that Patel was not in
point as it concerned the quite different
question as to whether, as a matter of public
policy, a party should be absolved from
having committed an illegal act, whereas in
the present appeal there was no suggestion
of any illegality committed by the claimant
herself under the 1985 Act. In short, the
so-called illegality defence in Patel did not
touch upon the issue of whether public
policy should deny a particular head of
damages: see also, A Alghari and C
Purshouse, ‘Damages for Reproductive
Negligence: Commercial Surrogacy on the
NHS?’ (2019) 135 LQR 405.
Reliance was also placed by the claimant on
the Canadian case of Wilhelmson v Dumma
(2017) BCSC 616, involving a claim based
on a lawful surrogacy in the United States,
but which remained illegal in Canada, the
country where the claim was being brought.
The point, however, was addressed only
briefly by the Supreme Court of British
Columbia and Briody was not cited to the
court. By contrast, the case of Rousillon v
Rousillon (1880) 14 Ch D 351, relied on by
the defendant, established that, if an
agreement contrary to the policy of English
law, was entered into in a country by the
law of which it was valid, an English court
would not enforce it. Fry J stated the
principle, at 369, as follows:
‘It appears to me, however, plain on
general principles that this court will not
enforce a contract against the public
policy of this country, wherever it may
be made. It seems to me almost absurd
to suppose that the courts of this
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country should enforce a contract which
they consider to be against public policy
simply because it happens to have been
made somewhere else.’
The same principle, it was argued, applied
in the present appeal where the agreement in
question was not simply one in restraint of
trade (as in Rousillon), but one which was
illegal under the criminal law. Had the
claimant entered into a commercial
surrogacy arrangement in the UK, no
damages would be awarded for the costs of
so doing. It would then seem rather odd for
an English court to sanction something
which is illegal in its own jurisdiction simply
because it is valid in another country. By
way of analogy, it was submitted that the
position was not too dissimilar from a
potential claim for the costs of an assisted
suicide. The example given was that of a
tortfeasor who injures a claimant to the
extent that he is mentally harmed to the
point where he is profoundly depressed and
suicidal. The claimant is unable to take his
own life and, therefore, contemplates
committing suicide by travelling to a
country (eg, Switzerland) where assisted
dying is lawful. It would be inconceivable,
according to the defendant, for the English
court to award the claimant special damages
for all the costs involved in his intended
suicide in that country. The court would not
make an award in those circumstances given
that assisted suicide was a criminal offence
in this country.
Much emphasis was also placed by the
defendant on the fact that the policy
considerations underlying s 2(1) of the 1985
Act were not limited to surrogacy
arrangements conducted in this country, but
had wider import in relation to any
commercial arrangements wherever they
may be operated. In short, considerations
relating to human dignity, protection of
children, avoiding exploitation of surrogate
mothers, etc., applied across the board and
were not confined to this jurisdiction.
Moreover, the English court was unlikely to
know the exact circumstances surrounding a
commercial surrogacy arrangement in a
foreign country – these may be entirely
unsatisfactory and exploitative of a claimant
seeking such an arrangement. It would also
be inherently difficult for an English court
to ‘police’ prospectively arrangements
offered in a foreign country. It was argued,
therefore, that any change in the law should
only be brought about by the Law
Commission and Parliament and not by the
courts. Indeed, the Law Commission has
already expressed concerns regarding
international surrogacy arrangements which
do not conform to UK law, in particular
those which operate on a commercial basis.
Significantly, there is no indication in its
recent Consultation Paper of a willingness to
change the current law on the illegality of
commercial surrogacy arrangements as
embodied in s 2(1) of the 1985 Act. On the
contrary, the provisional view taken is that
surrogacy agencies should not be able to
operate on a profit-making basis: see, Law
Commission’s Joint Consultation Paper,
Building Family Through Surrogacy: A New
Law, (CP 244, 6 June 2019), at 16.3.
(b) The ruling
Lady Hale (who gave the majority
judgment) considered three separate issues
raised in the appeal. The first was whether
the claimant could recover damages to fund
surrogacy arrangements using her own eggs.
On this point, her Ladyship concluded that
the Briody decision had not ruled out
damages for own-egg surrogacy
arrangements made in the UK; rather, it held
that whether it was reasonable to seek to
remedy the loss of a womb through
surrogacy depended on the chances of a
successful outcome. In the present appeal,
those chances were reasonable (above at
[44]).
The second issue was whether the claimant
could claim damages to fund a surrogacy
using donor eggs. Here again, her Ladyship
disagreed with Briody that damages for
donor-egg surrogacy arrangements could not
be recovered as they were not restorative of
what the claimant had lost. There had been
dramatic developments in the law’s idea of
what constituted a family and damages to
fund arrangements using donor eggs was the
closest the court could get to putting the
claimant in the position she would have
been in had she not been injured. Thus, as
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long as the arrangement has reasonable
prospects of success, damages for the
reasonable costs of it could be awarded. In
her Ladyship’s words, at [47]:
‘. . . a woman can hope for four things
from having a child: the experience of
carrying and giving birth to a child; the
perpetuation of one’s own genes; the
perpetuation of one’s partner’s genes;
and the pleasure of bringing up a child
as one’s own. Donor egg surrogacy
using a partner’s sperm gives her two of
those. And for many women, the
pleasure of bringing up children as one’s
own is far and away the most important
benefit of having children. If this is the
best that can be achieved to make good
what she has lost, why should she be
denied it?’
On the third issue, which was recognised as
being the most difficult, the majority
acknowledged that the UK courts would not
enforce a foreign contract if it would be
contrary to public policy. However, most
items in the costs bill for a surrogacy in
California could also be claimed if it
occurred in this country. In addition, it was
not against UK law for the claimant to do
the acts prohibited by s 2(1) of the 1985
Act. Significantly, there were also important
developments since Briody: (1) the courts
had striven to recognise the relationships
created by surrogacy; (2) government policy
now supported it; (3) assisted reproduction
had become widespread and socially
acceptable; and (4) the Law Commission
had proposed a surrogacy pathway which, if
accepted, would enable the child to be
recognised as the commissioning parents’
child from birth. Awards of damages for
foreign commercial surrogacy were,
therefore, no longer contrary to public
policy: ibid, at [45]–[49].
Conclusion
Although the majority of the Supreme Court
has upheld the award of damages for the
costs of foreign commercial arrangements, it
has also imposed important factors limiting
the availability and extent of such awards.
First, both the treatment programme and the
costs involved must be reasonable. Secondly,
it must be reasonable for the claimant to
seek the foreign commercial arrangements
proposed rather than to make arrangements
within the UK. Thirdly, a foreign surrogacy
was unlikely to be reasonable unless the
foreign country has a well-established
system in which the interests of all involved,
including the child, are properly safeguarded
(above at [53]).
It is noteworthy also that a strong dissenting
judgment was given by Lord Carnwath
(with whom Lord Reed agreed) on the third
issue. In his Lordship’s view, while the
present appeal was not concerned with
illegality, there was a broader principle of
legal coherence, which aimed to preserve
consistency between civil and criminal law.
It would go against that principle for civil
courts to award damages based on conduct
which, if undertaken in the UK, would
offend its criminal law. Whilst society’s
approach to surrogacy had developed, there
had been no change in the critical laws on
commercial surrogacy which led to the
refusal in Briody of damages on that basis.
In his view, therefore, it would not be
consistent with legal coherence to allow
damages to be awarded on a different basis
(above at [66]–[67]). In his Lordship’s view,
therefore, the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Briody was (and remained)
correct on this issue.
For further articles on this case in earlier
courts, see [2020] Fam Law 429, 573 and
1186.
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